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Abstract
We ¯nd that risk sharing in the European Union (EU) has been increasing over the
past decade due to increased cross-ownership of assets across countries. Industrial special-
ization has also been increasing over the last decade and we conjecture that risk sharing
plays an important causal e®ect by allowing countries to specialize without being subject
to higher income risk even though the variability of output may increase. We believe that
lower trade barriers may not have played a dominant causal role during this decade be-
cause the e®ect of lower trade barriers has probably already played itself out. We further
¯nd that the asymmetry of GDP °uctuations in the EU has declined steeply over the last
two decades. This may be due to economic policies becoming more similar as countries
were adjusting ¯scal policy in order to meet the Maastricht criteria, but a similar result
was found for U.S. states so the ¯nding may be due to a di®erent nature of the shocks to
the world economy in the 1990s. We expect to see a further rise in risk sharing between
EU countries, accompanied by more specialization. However, the resulting increase in
GDP asymmetry should be minor and will have small welfare costs because increased
risk sharing should lower income (GNP) asymmetry.
JEL Classi¯cation: F15, F2, F36, F43
Keywords: ¯nancial integration, regional specialization, international portfolio diversi¯-
cation, income insurance.
¤We thank Philipp Hartman, Lars Jonung, Max Watson, and participants at the DG ECFIN workshop
\Who will Own Europe? The Internationalisation of Asset Ownership in the EU Today and in the Future"
for useful comments. Oved Yosha died on August 7, 2003.1 Introduction
Assessing the economic consequences of ¯nancial integration is high on the agenda of economists
and policy makers around the world and, in particular, within the European Union (EU)
where ¯nancial integration is expected to rapidly increase following trade integration and the
advent of the Euro.
For the countries in the Euro area, a major concern is that adverse shocks to the economies
of individual members of the currency union can no longer be blunted by monetary policy
if such shocks only hit a single or a few countries. For example, if France happens to be in
a recession while the rest of the Euro area is booming, the European Central Bank will not
be able to lower the interest rate in order to stimulate the French economy. Such shocks,
that hit only one or few countries, are denoted idiosyncratic (or state-speci¯c) shocks and
if idiosyncratic shocks are prevalent the economies are said to exhibit asymmetry of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). In the face of signi¯cant GDP asymmetry, monetary union may
lead to a loss of welfare due to the lack of independent monetary policy, unless mechanisms
for achieving international income insurance and consumption smoothing (\risk sharing") are
in place.1
Mechanisms for sharing risk internationally include central ¯scal institutions as well as
market institutions. Fiscal institutions provide inter-country income insurance via a tax-
transfer system that, typically, lowers taxes and increases transfers to individuals and grants
to governments of countries that su®er an economic set-back. Market institutions include
developed capital markets through which the members of a union can share risk by smoothing
their income via cross-ownership of productive assets (portfolio diversi¯cation). Alternatively,
consumers may smooth their consumption (given their income) by adjusting their savings
rate; i.e., adjusting the size of their asset portfolio in response to shocks.
In this paper, we will focus on income smoothing using methods developed by Asdrubali,
S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996) who examine risk sharing among the states that make up the
United States (a successful monetary union). For the period 1964{90, they ¯nd that 39
percent of idiosyncratic (state-speci¯c) shocks to the per capita GDP of individual states
1In the long run, high GDP asymmetry may, in the absence of international risk sharing, even destabilize
the monetary union by generating incentives for secession in order to regain monetary independence.
1are smoothed on average through inter-state ownership patterns, i.e., through capital income
°ows across state borders. Their methods are based on measuring how closely personal
income (adjusted for federal transfers and contributions) follow state-level GDP|the details
are spelled out in the next Section.2 They further ¯nd that the amount of insurance through
inter-state capital income °ows has been rising over time and we will examine if this trend is
still continuing.
Using similar methods, S¿rensen and Yosha (1998) explore risk sharing patterns among
EU and OECD countries during the period 1966{90, ¯nding that factor income °ows do
not smooth Gross National Product (GNP) across countries. These results suggest that EU
capital markets have been less integrated than U.S. capital markets, at least until a decade
ago.
We update some of the above empirical results through the end of the 1990s, focusing on
income insurance from factor income °ows. Two major ¯ndings emerge. First, the amount of
insurance through inter-state capital income °ows in the United States has been rising further.
Second, in the latter part of the 1990s there is non-negligible insurance through international
capital income °ows in the EU|about 10 percent of idiosyncratic (country-speci¯c) shocks
to the GDP of individual countries are smoothed on average through this channel. In this
respect, the EU is beginning to converge towards the United States. This result is one of the
¯rst that actually corroborates empirically that uni¯ed Europe is becoming more similar to
the union of U.S. states in terms of integration at the macroeconomic level!3
The process of economic and monetary integration itself may a®ect the symmetry of
GDP °uctuations and it is of interest to explore this issue in the European context. Kalemli-
Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha (2003a) demonstrate empirically that inter-country income in-
surance (which may itself be a result of economic integration) induces higher specialization
in production.4 The simple intuition for this result is that as long as ownership is diversi¯ed,
2They also ¯nd that 13 percent of shocks are smoothed by the federal tax-transfer and grant system, 23
percent via saving or borrowing and lending, and 25 percent of shocks are not smoothed. Therefore, although
perfect insurance is not achieved, there is considerable risk sharing among U.S. states.
3A closely related literature, originating with Feldstein and Horioka (1980), ¯nds a high correlation between
aggregate investment and aggregate saving for most OECD countries and argues that such correlation is an
indicator of lack of ¯nancial integration. Giannone and Lenza (2003) ¯nd that investment-saving correlations
have become lower in the 1990s|a ¯nding that is consistent with our results.
4\Specialization" here refers to specialization relative to other countries (or states) within a group.
2countries or regions can be very specialized, with potentially high GDP volatility, while still
have low volatility of income.
Subsequently, Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha (2001) establish empirically that
higher specialization in production translates into more asymmetry of GDP °uctuations.
This result may not be surprising but, nonetheless, seems not to have been veri¯ed pre-
viously. Together, these ¯ndings substantiate an e®ect of income insurance on industrial
specialization which, other things equal, results in less symmetric output °uctuations.
We update the empirical analysis of specialization and GDP asymmetry, asking speci¯-
cally whether specialization and GDP asymmetry have risen in the EU as a result of better
risk sharing. We ¯nd that country-level specialization in the EU has been increasing during
the 1990s; however, GDP asymmetry has declined in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. At least
for this sample period, the e®ect of specialization on asymmetry has been overwhelmed by
other forces that we do not attempt to identify in the present article.
However, asymmetry of output (GDP) may not be important for the members of the EU
if there is substantial risk sharing between members of the union. Rather, the asymmetry of
income and of consumption are, arguably, the relevant indicators of potential losses of welfare.
Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha (2003b) demonstrate that asymmetry of personal income
across U.S. states is substantially lower than asymmetry of output corroborating the empirical
relevance of this observation. In this paper, we update the calculations for U.S. states and
further estimate the level of GNP asymmetry for the EU. We ¯nd that, for the U.S. states,
asymmetry of income remains much lower than asymmetry of GDP. Surprisingly, for EU
countries, GNP is more asymmetric than GDP in spite of positive risk sharing in the 1990s.
We conjecture that a further rise in risk sharing in the EU will reverse this result similarly
to what we ¯nd for the U.S. states benchmark.
Overall, our results are encouraging in relation to concerns about the welfare e®ects
of asymmetric shocks in the EU because they indicate that the income (and hence also
consumption) of EU members is slowly becoming bu®ered against country-speci¯c shocks to
GDP. While this increase in risk sharing may encourage more industrial specialization and
thereby more asymmetry of output (other things equal) this need not lead to more asymmetry
of income (and consumption) across countries. Indeed, for the United States the asymmetry of
state-level income is much lower than the asymmetry of state-level output. This last pattern
3is, however, not yet observed for the EU members. We argued previously that risk sharing
may be particularly important for countries in the Euro area and we conjecture|no empirical
evidence is yet available|that the formation of a monetary union itself will facilitate further
risk sharing, for instance, by increasing international diversi¯cation of mutual funds through
removing costs of currency hedging and through greater transparency.
In the next Section, we give a fuller discussion of the existing empirical literature. In
Section 3, we present the updated empirical analysis and in Section 4, we discuss implications
for policy in Europe.
2 Literature Review
U.S. States as a Benchmark for the EU
There is by now a fairly substantial literature studying U.S. states, and sometimes also regions
within other countries, as examples of successful currency unions that can fruitfully be used
as a benchmark for the countries in the EU and, in particular, the Euro area. Among the ¯rst
papers in this tradition were Eichengreen (1990) and De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1993),
who contrast regional and national data on macroeconomic variables such as employment
and output growth rates, labor mobility, and the real exchange rate.5 A recent volume
that continuous this tradition, and provides many more references, is edited by Hess and van
Wincoop (2000). A particularly in°uential early paper, that aims at measuring the amount of
risk sharing provided to U.S. states by the U.S. federal government through federal transfers
to individuals and taxes, is that of Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992), who estimates that a
one dollar drop in the income of a state would be compensated by an increase in transfers
minus taxes of more than 60 cents. Their (very large) estimate of risk sharing through
federal government ¯scal policy has been disputed by, inter alia, von Hagen (1992), who
¯nds signi¯cant but much smaller risk sharing from the federal government.6
5The literature initiated by Eichengreen (1990), Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992), and others, is inspired by
Mundell's (1961) classic analysis of Optimum Currency Areas. Alesina and Barro (2002) provide a modern
analysis of currency unions. They focus on the volume of trade within a currency union, assessing how trade
costs a®ect the desirability of a union, and on the fact that joining a currency union can commit a country to
monetary stability.
6These authors were concerned with estimating the amount of income insurance provided by the U.S.
federal government to U.S. states as a benchmark for the income insurance role that might be required from
4Testing for Full Risk Sharing
The characterization of full risk sharing has been known for many decades since the seminal
work of Arrow and Debreu. Yet, the empirical implications of full risk sharing, also known
as perfect or e±cient risk sharing, were not investigated until recently. A good place to start
is Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991), who point out that if idiosyncratic risk is fully shared
among a group of consumers, then a consumer's consumption should be a®ected only by
aggregate °uctuations and not by any idiosyncratic shock that hits the consumer such as
job loss, sickness, or a change in the consumer's income. These authors test this proposition
using micro-data (person or household data) from the United States.7 Many similar tests
have been carried out since with the overall conclusion that the data do not support the full
risk sharing hypothesis. Obstfeld (1994b) carries over this logic to the country level, testing
for full risk sharing among G7 countries, also rejecting the hypothesis. His line of research
was re¯ned by several authors. Important contributions are Canova and Ravn (1996), who
also reject full risk sharing, and Lewis (1996).
Channels of Risk Sharing
Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996) shift the focus from testing for full risk sharing to
measuring the amount of risk sharing that is achieved through various channels. The ¯rst
channel consists of income insurance through an inter-regionally or internationally diversi¯ed
investment portfolio. The citizens or the government of a country can invest in stock markets
overseas, or more generally, can own claims to output produced in other countries. For
example, if mutual funds or pension funds in one country invest internationally, the income
of the citizens in that country includes factor income from abroad and will partly co-move
with the output in other countries. If ¯nancial intermediaries in one country lend to ¯rms in
other countries, the °ow of interest payments smoothes the income of citizens in the lending
country. If risk is not fully shared through factor income °ows, there is scope for further
a future central ¯scal authority in the EU. We endorse von Hagen's estimate, which is close to the number
obtained by Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996). For further work on income insurance through ¯scal
policy, see Gavin and Perotti (1997), Fatas and Mihov (2001), S¿rensen, Wu, and Yosha (2001), and Buettner
(2002). See also Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993) and Goodhart and Smith (1993).
7Townsend (1994) tests the full risk sharing proposition using micro-data from villages in India.
5income smoothing through taxes and transfers of a supra-national government (e.g., the U.S.
federal government). This channel is the one identi¯ed ¯rst by Sala-i-Martin and Sachs
(1992), except that Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha measure all risk sharing in relation to
shocks to output since shocks to income|used by Sala-i-Martin and Sachs|already re°ect
risk sharing from cross-ownership of assets. If risk is still not fully shared, there is scope
for further consumption smoothing through saving behavior. (Such consumption smoothing
through saving is governed to a large extent by inter-temporal considerations.)8 Finally,
some fraction of shocks may not be smoothed at all. If this fraction is statistically signi¯cant
this constitutes a rejection of full risk sharing with an interpretation similar to the tests
popularized by Mace (1991).
The method developed by Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996) has been extended
recently by M¶ elitz and Zumer (1999), who allow for risk sharing to depend on such country-
speci¯c (or state-speci¯c, depending on the case) features such as demographics, size, and
wealth. They apply the method to U.S. states, obtaining results that are quite similar to
those obtained by Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996), as well as to other federations
and countries for which regional data are available (for instance, Canada and France). In all
countries, there are non-negligible amounts of risk sharing via the various channels but full
risk sharing is rejected.
Another important extension was recently suggested by Becker and Ho®mann (2002),
who focus on dynamic aspects of risk sharing. In particular, they estimate permanent and
transitory components of a three-dimensional model involving country-level GDP, GNP, and
consumption. Their results indicate that permanent shocks are insured (ex-ante), while
transitory shocks are mainly smoothed (ex-post) via saving behavior. We believe that this is
8According to models of forward looking consumer behavior, if shocks to GDP are highly persistent, and
not smoothed through international factor income °ows and/or through taxes and transfers, individuals will
optimally choose to engage in very little consumption smoothing through saving. If the shocks to GDP are
transitory, and not smoothed through international factor income °ows, individuals will optimally choose to
engage in much consumption smoothing through saving. Baxter and Crucini's (1995) insight is relevant here.
If, for some reason, there is no income insurance through factor income °ows but agents can trade in a risk-less
bond, then|if shocks to GDP are transitory|full risk sharing will be closely approximated. That is, when
shocks to GDP are transitory, a risk-less bond (i.e., the credit market) is a close substitute for income insurance
(i.e., for capital markets). In contrast, if shocks to GDP are highly persistent, consumption smoothing through
trade in a risk-less bond will not approximate the full risk sharing allocation, namely, the credit market will
not closely mimic the role of capital markets|shocks that were not insured ex-ante on capital markets will,
by the logic of the permanent income model of consumption, not be smoothed ex-post on credit markets.
6a promising line of research.
Consumption Correlations and International Real Business Cycle Models
Closely related is the international real business cycle literature, most notably Backus, Ke-
hoe, and Kydland (1992) and more recently Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Stockman and
Tesar (1995). These authors develop two-country general equilibrium models with complete
¯nancial markets. A central prediction of these models is that consumption correlations
across countries should be high. These authors have taken this prediction to international
macroeconomic data, ¯nding that inter-country consumption correlations are nowhere close
to unity. In fact, these consumption correlations are not higher than country GDP correla-
tions, as we would expect if there were only partial international risk sharing|a phenomenon
that has become known as the \international consumption correlation puzzle."9
Welfare Gains from Risk Sharing
Another closely related literature calculates welfare gains from (international) risk sharing.
Testing for full risk sharing and measuring the amount of risk that is shared through various
channels is of interest only if such welfare gains are non-negligible. Cole and Obstfeld (1991)
¯nd that these gains are tiny, but it soon became clear|see Obstfeld (1994c) and van Wincoop
(1994)|that this result is due to their assumption that shocks to GDP are transitory. If
shocks are permanent (or highly persistent) then the gains from insuring them are quite
meaningful. van Wincoop (1994) estimates that under the more realistic assumption of
permanent shocks (more precisely: Assuming that country-level GDP is well described by a
random walk) the gain from perfect risk sharing would be equivalent to a permanent increase
in consumption of about 2{3 percent. Obstfeld (1994c) provides a closed form solution
for the welfare gains due to a reduction in consumption variability in a partial equilibrium
setting under the assumption that agents have Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)
utility functions. van Wincoop (1994) computes welfare gains from risk sharing in a general
9Stockman and Tesar (1995) suggest country speci¯c taste shocks as an explanation of the puzzle. S¿rensen
and Yosha (1998) show that the low consumption correlations are consistent with taste shocks, although it
cannot be ruled out that the low consumption correlations simply re°ect noise (e.g., measurement error) in
the consumption data.
7equilibrium model|also assuming CRRA utility as well as more general types of utility
functions|relying on approximation techniques. More precisely, van Wincoop calculates
non-exploited gains from risk sharing using consumption data, measuring how much further
gains from risk sharing can be achieved by moving from the observed consumption allocation
(in the data) to the perfect risk sharing consumption allocation.
Risk Sharing and Home Bias
The ¯nding of low international risk sharing is fully consistent with the well-known \home
bias puzzle" documented by French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995). In
a world with full information, no moral hazard, no trading cost, and the same degree of
risk aversion across agents, all agents should (according to basic theory) hold an identical
\world" portfolio of assets. It is, however, observed that, for example, the English hold
the vast majority of their assets in the form of U.K. equities and Americans hold the vast
majority of their assets in the form of U.S. equities|an observation that is referred to as
\home bias."10
S¿rensen, Wu, and Yosha (2002) provide direct empirical evidence that these phenomena
are indeed related: On average, risk sharing from international cross-ownership of assets,
as measured by the smoothing of GNP, is higher in countries that hold a higher amount of
foreign equity relative to GDP.11 The lack of risk sharing across countries, and its relation
to home bias, motivated Shiller (1993) to propose the issuance of assets with returns that
are directly linked to the growth of GDP in various countries. International macro risk could
then be alleviated via trade in such country-speci¯c GDP-linked securities (by each country
going short in the securities linked to its own GDP).
10Coval and Moskowitz (1999) even ¯nd \home bias at home." They ¯nd that U.S. institutional investors,
while holding assets from all over the United States, still hold a more than proportional amount of assets
issued in their own geographical region. (For a similar result, see Huberman (2001).) However, this home bias
is much less severe than the home bias found in international data.
11See Milesi-Ferretti and Lane (2001) for data on international asset holdings.
8Economic Integration, Industrial Specialization, and Asymmetry of Economic
Fluctuations
Much of the debate on the desirability of economic integration centers on the degree of syn-
chronization (symmetry) of macroeconomic °uctuations across countries. It has been noted
that the process of economic integration itself will a®ect the symmetry of macroeconomic
°uctuations. Frankel and Rose (1998) argue that removal of trade barriers will entail more
correlated business cycles since a higher level of trade will allow demand shocks to spread
more easily across national borders. They further mention that economic integration will ren-
der policy shocks more correlated and that knowledge and technology spillovers will increase
(Coe and Helpman 1995). These factors should also contribute to °uctuations becoming more
symmetric following economic integration. Krugman (1993), on the other hand, claims that
lower barriers to trade will induce countries to specialize more rendering output °uctuations
less symmetric.12 We illustrate these various e®ects in Figure 1, adapted from Kalemli-Ozcan,
S¿rensen, and Yosha (2001).13
In the remainder of this article, we focus on updating our previous work on specialization
and asymmetry, rather than attempting to provide a balanced view of the literature|in
particular we say little about the important issue of the e®ect of lower trade barriers.
Theoretical Literature on Risk Sharing and Industrial Specialization
With uninsured production risk, the higher variance of GDP resulting from specialized out-
put may entail a welfare loss that outweighs the bene¯ts. The argument was ¯rst formulated
by Brainard and Cooper (1968), Kemp and Liviatan (1973), and Ru±n (1974). In response,
Helpman and Razin (1978) show that if production risk can be insured through trade in
assets, the bene¯ts of specialization will resurface.14 This work has consequences for the
theory of economic growth. Obstfeld (1994a) constructs a model in which countries choose
12Krugman corroborates his argument with the observation that U.S. states are more specialized in produc-
tion than European countries.
13Imbs (2003) contributes to this debate by estimating a three-equation system with three endogenous
variables|pairwise GDP correlations, bilateral trade, and industrial specialization. His results are generally
in line with previous research.
14Further work on this topic includes Anderson (1981), Grossman and Razin (1985), and Helpman (1988).
See also Heathcote and Perri (2001) for models along these lines.
9between investing in risky projects with high average returns or in safe projects with low
average returns. International asset trade allows them to hold a diversi¯ed portfolio and
to shift investment towards high return projects. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) stress that
developing countries have fewer opportunities to diversify production and tend to specialize
in safe technologies. Insurance permits them to take risks that|with some probability|will
translate into an economic take-o®. In Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), ¯nancial intermedi-
aries pool risks and help achieve higher and safer returns on investment. In Saint-Paul (1992),
the basic trade-o® is between the gains from specialization due to comparative advantage in
production and a lower variance of output, while Feeney (1999) develops the idea that in
the presence of learning by doing in production, specialization entails higher growth during
a transition period.
Empirical Evidence on Risk Sharing and Specialization
Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha (2003a) demonstrates empirically that more insurance
among regions (countries) is associated with higher industrial specialization of these regions
(countries). They estimate a cross-sectional regression using about 150 regional-level ob-
servations and, to guard against potential endogeneity (reverse causality) of the amount of
inter-regional risk sharing achieved, they used investor protection indices, suggested by La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), as instruments.15
It is worth noting that Kim (1995) ¯nds specialization in the United States (at the state
level) has decreased continuously since the 1930s (after increasing in the late 19th century),
while Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996) ¯nd risk sharing among U.S. states has in-
creased over time. These ¯ndings, together with the results of Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and
Yosha (2003a), would seem to predict an increase in specialization. Our interpretation is
that the e®ects we identify are only parts of the picture and there are long-run technological
changes that reduce the gains from specialization for a given level of risk sharing.16 This
15Ramey and Ramey (1995) note that in the presence of aggregate uninsured risk, countries will take fewer
additional risks. Therefore, the volatility of aggregate output may a®ect the regional specialization within a
federation of regions. To control for this, Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha (2003a) calculate the volatility
of group-wide GDP for each group of regions (countries) and include it as a control variable in the regression.
16Kim (1995) suggests that technological advances have made production less dependent on local resources
and that factors of production have become more mobile.
10process is likely ongoing in the United States as well as in the EU, although we expect it to
be counteracted in the EU during the next decade or two as ¯nancial markets continue to
integrate.17 Our work does not allow us to predict which e®ect will dominate in the short
run although we suspect that the e®ect of ¯nancial integration may dominate for a while due
to stronger international ¯nancial integration and reduction in home bias.18
Economic Integration and Asymmetry of Output Fluctuations
Academic research on the asymmetry of shocks to regions and nations dates back at least
to Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) and Weber (1991), who study country-level output growth-
rate correlations for European countries and to Stockman (1988), who distinguishes between
country-speci¯c and industry-speci¯c shocks. The latter paper inspired numerous studies,
e.g., Kollman (1995), Fatas (1997), and Hess and Shin (1998). Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1993) focus on demand versus supply shocks and used a vector autoregression procedure to
study them, whereas De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1993) distinguish between region-speci¯c
and country-speci¯c shocks. Massmann and Mitchell (2003) reconsider this literature and ¯nd
that Eurozone business cycles have become more correlated in the late 1990s after a period of
divergence in the early 1990s following German uni¯cation and the European currency crisis.
Industrial specialization will likely have implications for the amount of asymmetry of
macroeconomic shocks. If industry-speci¯c shocks are important then greater specialization
should increase the asymmetry of shocks. Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha (2001) deal
with this question empirically studying a cross-section of U.S. states and a cross-section of
EU/OECD countries.19 They point out that the welfare gain from moving from ¯nancial
autarky to full risk sharing, where the value of output is fully pooled through ¯nancial cross-
ownership, can be used as a measure of asymmetry. The intuition is that the greater the
asymmetry in GDP °uctuations within a group of countries (or regions) the larger the bene¯t
from smoothing these °uctuations through risk sharing within the group.
17The increase in specialization in the United States in the late 19th century ¯ts this picture as the regional
U.S. capital markets were becoming integrated during that time; see Davis (1965).
18Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) provide evidence that industrial specialization declines with GDP at early stages
of development and increases with GDP at later stages of development. They do not relate their ¯nding to
risk sharing or risk taking.
19Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha (2001) provide a simple model that helps clarify the role of industry-
speci¯c versus other types of shocks.
11These authors derive a simple closed form expression for the gains from risk sharing un-
der the assumption of CRRA utility.20 The advantage of this measure is that|subject to
the simpli¯cations needed to get analytical solutions|it can be interpreted as a measure
of the dis-utility that such asymmetry will in°ict on the average person.21 They ¯nd that
greater industrial specialization indeed leads to lower synchronization of GDP °uctuations
(i.e., more asymmetry). They stress, though, that more asymmetry need not be detrimental
to the welfare of the residents of an economic or monetary union because|in the presence
of risk sharing|income is partly insured from GDP °uctuation and income (or GNP) °uc-
tuations need, therefore, not be more asymmetric. In addition, although not the focus here,
consumption may further be bu®ered from income °uctuations.
3 Measuring Risk Sharing, Specialization, and Fluctuations
Asymmetry
3.1 Risk Sharing
We construct a measure of the amount of risk sharing obtained through cross-ownership of
¯nancial assets. The measure takes the value 1 if there is perfect risk sharing from cross-
ownership, i.e., if the GNP of a typical country does not move with country-speci¯c move-
ments in its GDP and the measure takes the value 0 if GNP moves one-to-one with GDP|the
situation with no risk sharing.
Consider the following set of cross-sectional regressions (one regression for each year t)
for a group of countries indexed by sub-script i:
¢log GNPit ¡ ¢log GNPt = constant + ¯K;t (¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it ; (1)
where GNPit and GDPit are country i's year t real per capita GNP and GDP, respectively,
20Kim, Kim, and Levin (2000), using a di®erent approach, obtain analytical solutions for gains from risk
sharing allowing for quite general dynamics, although their set-up is restricted to a two-country framework
that makes it less applicable for actual empirical calculations.
21Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha (2001) also use simple measures of asymmetry based on pair-wise
GDP correlations obtaining similar patterns.
12and GNPt and GDPt are the year t average real per capita GNP and GDP for the group.22
The coe±cient ¯K;t measures the average co-movement of the countries' idiosyncratic GNP
growth with their idiosyncratic GDP growth in year t; i.e., the co-movement of GNP and
GDP growth rates when aggregate growth rates have been subtracted. The smaller the co-
movement, the more GNP is bu®ered against GDP °uctuations. If income smoothing is
perfect then idiosyncratic GNP does not co-move with idiosyncratic GDP at all. In fact, for
each country GNP growth equals the group's GNP growth. Therefore, ¯K;t takes the value 0
simply because the left-hand side of equation (1) is always 0.
Since GNP equals GDP plus net factor income °ows, this regression provides a measure
of the extent to which net factor income °ows provide income insurance|the lower ¯K;t, the
higher is income insurance within the group in year t.23 We use 1 ¡ ¯K;t as a measure of
risk sharing through international factor income °ows. If no country-speci¯c risk is hedged
in international capital markets we would expect to ¯nd ¯K;t = 1 because, for each country
in the group, GNP would then equal GDP and our risk sharing measure, 1 ¡ ¯K;t, would be
0.
Figure 2 displays a smoothed graph of the series 1 ¡ ¯K;t against time. The ¯K;t values
are estimated year-by-year for the sample of EU member states (except Luxembourg) and
the values at neighboring time-periods are smoothed (using a Normal kernel smoother) in
order to focus on the trend-movements in the series. Surprisingly, the estimated risk-sharing
is negative in the early 1990s|in those years a decrease in GDP was typically associated
with an even larger decrease in GNP! In order to examine if this was due to the banking
crisis in Finland and Sweden during these years, or to the impact of the Soviet break-up on
Finnish foreign trade, we also display the graph leaving out those two countries. Clearly, the
Scandinavian banking crisis explains much of the negative risk sharing in those years. We do
not know exactly why, but the large negative shocks to GDP that those countries su®ered in
that period were accompanied by even larger negative shocks to the countries' GNP. At the
22\Real" GDP (GNP) refers to GDP (GNP) divided by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of country i.
We use the CPI, rather than a GDP de°ator, because the relevant measure for risk sharing is value of GDP
(GNP) in terms of consumption goods. The GDP de°ator is typically quite similar to the CPI, although large
di®erences in our sample can be found for countries (or states) in which proceeds from oil-extraction is a large
fraction of GDP.
23See Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996), S¿rensen, and Yosha (1998), and M¶ elitz and Zumer (1999).
13time, the degree of ¯nancial integration in the EU was not large enough to compensate for
this e®ect resulting in negative average risk sharing in the EU.
The main fact revealed by the graphs is that by the end of the 1990s international ¯nancial
integration in the EU ¯nally reached a level where GNP °uctuations are somewhat decoupled
from GDP °uctuations. The increase in risk sharing from factor income °ows is quite dramatic
and seems much too steep to be driven by sample variation.
Alternatively, we estimate the amount of risk sharing over several years using the panel
data regression (which pools the regressions over all the years in the sample):
¢log GNPit ¡ ¢log GNPt = constant + ¯K (¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it : (2)
In Table 1, we show results for the periods 1973{82, 1983{92, 1993{2000.24 We estimated
the regressions for the group of 8 long-time EU countries25|this group of countries may
have developed closer ¯nancial integration during our sample periods than the more recent
entrants to the EU.26 Alternatively, the results are also given for the full set of current EU
members (minus Luxembourg) and for the current Euro area (again leaving out Luxembourg).
The results con¯rm the increase in risk sharing in the 1990s displayed in Figure 2. For the
period 1972{82 risk sharing was basically nil among the EU countries (borderline positive
for the smaller group), while risk sharing was signi¯cantly negative for the larger group as
discussed previously. For the period since 1993, risk sharing is positive and clearly statistically
signi¯cant in all three groups of countries. The amount of risk sharing is higher in the smaller
group of long-time EU members for all sub-periods, although not strongly so except for the
1983{92 period. It is likely that mutual ¯nancial integration and risk sharing will increase
faster for the countries that have adopted the Euro but more years are needed before this
can be discerned by our statistical methods.
In Table 2, we display numbers for risk sharing among U.S. states. The numbers have
24The regression is similar to the one estimated by Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996). They included
time-¯xed e®ects (a dummy-variable for each year), rather than subtracting aggregate growth, but this makes
little di®erence to the results so we choose the slightly more transparent form here.
25Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (Luxem-
bourg is left out because it is small and atypical).
26S¿rensen and Yosha (1998) consider risk sharing among this group of EU countries. The results here will
di®er slightly for identical time-periods due to revisions of the National Accounts.
14a slightly di®erent interpretation than the numbers for risk sharing through international
factor income °ows among countries because GNP numbers are not available at the state
level. Instead, numbers for income are used. Appendix A displays the relation between
GDP, GNP, and personal income in the National Accounts.27 In order to compare the OECD
and the EU more closely to the U.S., S¿rensen and Yosha (1998) also examine risk sharing
between OECD countries and EU countries based on personal income and ¯nd that about
10-15% of GDP shocks are smoothed, so one may want to subtract this order of magnitude
from the U.S. estimates of risk sharing in order to get a rough comparison with the estimates
for the EU. S¿rensen and Yosha ¯nd that the di®erence between the results obtained using
GNP and the results obtained using personal income is mainly due to income smoothing
through corporate savings.
In any event, the results of Table 2 are consistent with U.S. a highly signi¯cant amount
of income smoothing between U.S. states with the amount of risk sharing increasing decade-
by-decade as found by Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha using data from 1963{1990. (Some of
the results for that sample di®er slightly from those presented in Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and
Yosha (1996) due to revisions of the state-level GDP data.) Clearly, the trend identi¯ed by
those earlier authors is continuing through the 1990s with|according to the highly signi¯cant
point estimate| more than half the variation of state-speci¯c GDP shocks being smoothed
through cross-state income °ows in the 1990s.
As an alternative measure of risk sharing, we calculated (for the EU sample) simple
correlations of country-level GDP and GNP with EU-wide GDP and GNP, respectively, as
popularized by Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992). (For brevity, we do not tabulate the
details.) We ¯nd that the correlation of country-level GNP with EU-wide GNP increases
in the late 1990s. This is the result that would be expected if international risk sharing is
increasing and it is, therefore, consistent with the results presented above. This demonstrates
27More precisely, we use updated measures of \state income" as constructed for 1963{90 in Asdrubali,
S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996). State income consists of personal income after subtracting out all federal transfers
and allocating all non-personal federal taxes to income (attempting to approximate what personal income
would be without any federal taxes and transfers). Further, income of state governments that is not derived
from personal taxes, like corporate- and severance-taxes, is available to the residents of states via the state
governments and is also included in state income. We consider GNP the better \income" measure to use
although the main patterns of risk sharing can be expected to be quite similar. The di®erence between GDP
and GNP in the national accounts is mainly due to cross-border °ows of dividends and interest, while personal
income for given GDP is also a®ected by, e.g., patterns of corporate saving and capital depreciation.
15that our results are not sensitive to the exact choice of empirical methods applied.
3.2 Specialization
We here explain how the index of specialization used by Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha
(2003a) is calculated and update their results using the most recent data.
We calculate the specialization index for sectors at the 1-digit and 2-digit manufacturing
International Standard Industrial Classi¯cation (ISIC) levels. The 1-digit sectors are manu-
facturing, agriculture, government, and so forth. The detailed sector de¯nitions for the 1-digit
and 2-digit manufacturing sectors are listed in Appendix B.28 The degree of specialization
at the 1-digit level is likely to be more important for overall diversi¯cation of shocks to the
economy. However, we may get a clearer picture by looking at the manufacturing sub-sectors
that respond mainly to market forces. The level of output in 1-digit sectors like agriculture
and mining is determined primarily by endowments of fertile soil and extractable minerals, or
the activities of agricultural lobbyists. The size of the government (1-digit) sector is primarily
determined by social and political factors.
The specialization index for manufacturing is computed (for each country) for the relevant
sample years as follows. Let GDPs
i denote the GDP of manufacturing sub-sector s in country
i, and GDP
M
i the total manufacturing GDP of this country. We measure the distance between
the vector of sector shares in country i, GDPs
i = GDP
M
i , and the vector of average sector shares
in the EU-countries other than i:
SPECi =
S X
s=1
Ã
GDPs
i
GDP
M
i
¡
1
J ¡ 1
X
j6=i
GDPs
j
GDP
M
j
!2
; (3)
where S is the number of sectors and J is the number of countries considered (the subset of
the EU for which we were able to ¯nd the relevant data). Notice that SPECi measures how
the composition of manufacturing in country i di®ers from the composition of manufacturing
in the other countries of the EU. The index of 1-digit specialization is computed similarly
using total country-level GDP rather than manufacturing GDP and 1-digit sectors rather
28The sectors used correspond to those used by Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha (2003a). In the ¯rst
draft of this article we presented ¯gures based on slightly more disaggregated 2-digit manufacturing sectors
but some of those sectors were very tiny and this made the results somewhat fragile.
16than manufacturing sub-sectors. We calculated similar indices for the 50 U.S. states for the
same sub-period.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 display the average specialization index for the EU countries and the
U.S. states, for 1-digit sectors and 2-digit manufacturing sectors, respectively, for the period
1991{2000. (We have data only for few countries before 1991. Belgium and the Netherlands
are left out since our data source only included data for these countries from 1995 onwards.)
The Figures show that the U.S. states are much more specialized than the EU countries.
This result is not surprising given that U.S. states are smaller on average than EU countries.29
We focus on the time-trends of the indices. The more interesting results are found in Figure 3
for the 1-digit level: For the United States, specialization has declined, extending the trend
that was found by Kim (1995). Importantly, this trend is not found for the EU countries where
the degree of specialization has increased signi¯cantly at the 1-digit level. Our interpretation
is that the downward trend found for the United States re°ects the long-run technological
factors identi¯ed by Kim (1995), but that this trend has (at least temporarily) been reversed
due to ¯nancial market integration in the European Union.30
For the 2-digit manufacturing sectors we see|for both the EU and the U.S. states|an
increase followed by a decline at the 2-digit manufacturing level. An inspection (not in the
¯gure) of the 2-digit specialization pattern reveals that this pattern (in the EU case) is mainly
driven by Ireland, which displayed very high growth during the 1990s, partly due to large
in°ows of foreign direct investment. Nonetheless, the (weak) overall trends at the 2-digit level
is slightly upwards for the EU countries and slightly downward for the U.S. states consistent
with the ¯nding for the 1-digit level.
29A larger region is likely to be less specialized due to greater heterogeneity of population and of within-
region geophysical characteristics such as climate, landscape, and natural resources. Furthermore, in larger
regions, scale economies in production are more likely to be exhausted for some industries.
30This may also be the result of lower trade-barriers, see Krugman (1993), but since barriers to within-EU
trade have been low for some time now, one might conjecture that the rise in ¯nancial integration in the
late 1990s, as documented above, might have played an important role in the recent rise in country-level
specialization.
173.3 Asymmetry of GDP versus Asymmetry of GNP and Income
Our measure of GDP asymmetry builds on the following counter-factual thought experiment:31
Consider a group of countries each inhabited by a representative risk averse consumer who
derives utility from consumption of a homogeneous non-storable good.32 It is well known that
under commonly used assumptions|symmetric information, no transaction costs, and iden-
tical CRRA utility and rate of time preference for all countries|perfect risk sharing among
the countries in the group implies that ci
t = kigdpt :33 Here ci
t is the per capita consumption
in country i, gdpt is the aggregate per capita GDP of the group of countries under consid-
eration, and ki is a country-speci¯c constant that does not vary with economic outcomes or
over time.
For each country, we compare the expected utility of consuming the allocation under
perfect risk sharing (kigdpt) with that of consuming the output of the country (gdpi
t). The
di®erence represents potential gains from risk sharing that we will use as the basis for con-
structing our measure of °uctuations asymmetry. The logic is that the more a country can
gain from sharing risk with other countries in a group, the more asymmetric are its GDP
shocks relative to the group. (An analogous reasoning holds for U.S. states.)
To quantify these gains we must make distributional assumptions. Let the natural loga-
rithm of the per capita GDP of the group and the per capita GDP of each country be random
walks with drift. Further suppose that, conditional on gdpi
0 and gdp0, the joint distribution
of the log-di®erences of these processes is stationary, iid, Normal: ¢loggdpt » N(¹;¾2);
¢loggdpi
t » N(¹i;¾2
i ), and cov(¢loggspi
t ; ¢loggdpt) = covi for all t.34 With these as-
sumptions Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha (2001) derives closed form solutions for the
31See Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha (2001).
32In macro-theoretic parlance, this group constitutes a \stochastic endowment economy" in the sense that
the GDP of these countries is regarded by consumers as exogenous and stochastic.
33The CRRA utility function, which includes the logarithmic utility function as a special case, is commonly
used in macroeconomics and is generally considered as having good properties. The critical assumption here
is that all countries or states are assumed to have the same attitude towards risk. If one region were less
tolerant of risk than others it would be optimal for it to invest in international assets that would help lower
the variance of consumption below that of \world" (EU or total U.S.) output in return for a lower average
level of consumption. Note that we here abstract from investment, depreciation, etc. and simply assume that
world consumption equals world output|our regressions are not a®ected by this short-cut that is made to
simplify the discussion.
34This assumption involves an approximation since the aggregate GDP cannot, in general, be strictly log-
normally distributed if each country's GDP is log-normally distributed.
18potential gains from risk sharing assuming identical CRRA utility functions for all countries.
We will here use the solution for log-utility, which yields simple and intuitive expressions.35
The potential gains from risk sharing are expressed in terms of consumption certainty
equivalence. We do so by calculating the permanent percentage increase in the level of
consumption that would generate an equivalent increase in expected utility. More precisely,
the gain in utility (of moving from autarky to perfect risk sharing) equals the gain in utility
that would be achieved by increasing consumption permanently from GDPi0 to GDPi0¤(1+Gi).
Gi is our country-by-country measure of °uctuations asymmetry and, for log-utility, is given
by the expression:
Gi =
1
±
µ
1
2
¾2 +
1
2
¾2
i ¡ covi
¶
: (4)
The intuition for this formula is straightforward. First, the gain from sharing risk is higher
for countries with a lower covariance between ¢loggdpi
t and ¢loggdpt. The interpretation
is that countries with \counter-cyclical" output provide insurance to other countries by sta-
bilizing aggregate output and such countries are compensated accordingly in the risk sharing
agreement. Second, the higher the variance of country i's GDP, other things equal the more
it will bene¯t from sharing risk with other countries. Third, the higher the variance of the
aggregate gross product of the group, keeping the variance of country i's GDP constant,
the more other countries would be willing to \pay" country i for joining the risk sharing
arrangement.
In the empirical implementation, the parameters ¾2, ¾2
i , and covi are estimated using
country-level (or state-level) and aggregate GDP data. ± is the discount rate and we use a
value of 2 percent. Because our measure is based on the utility that a country would obtain
from consuming the value of its GDP we use, as our output measure, nominal GDP de°ated
by the Consumer Price Index (CPI).36
We calculate the asymmetry measure for EU countries and for U.S. states for the 1980s
and the 1990s. We also calculate the measure using GNP data rather than GDP data. Note
35The empirical results are not very di®erent for general CRRA utility.
36We stress the logic of de°ating by the CPI rather than by a GDP-de°ator: Since our measure is utility
based, we want measured output to re°ect consumption in autarky (with countries consuming the value of
their GDP). Thus, we want to translate GDP to the amount of consumption that it can buy. This is obtained
by de°ating using the CPI.
19that if risk sharing from factor income °ows is perfect, such that the GNP of all countries
(states) shows identical growth, the GNP-based measure of asymmetry will be zero, as no
further gains from risk sharing are possible.
We show the results in Table 3. For both U.S. states and European countries the level
of GDP asymmetry has declined dramatically from the 1980s to the 1990s. It seems that
country-level and regional-level business cycles have become less asymmetric. We cannot tell
what lies behind this observation, whether this is a \structural" more permanent pattern
or is the result of the type of shocks driving GDP variation in the 1980s versus the 1990s
(the early 1980s saw much turmoil in ¯nancial markets). If we were to venture a guess, we
think the decline in asymmetry in the 1990s is due to di®erent types of shocks hitting the
economies in these two sub-periods.
For the U.S. states, high risk sharing is re°ected in much lower asymmetry of income
than of state-level GDP. Surprisingly, for the EU countries GNP is more asymmetric than
GDP. Recall that GNP equals GDP plus net factor income (mainly pro¯ts, dividends, and
interest) from other countries. If net factor income °ows from other countries are as volatile
as the GDP of those countries|as in the textbook case where countries directly trade rights
to country level output|then GNP asymmetry must be lower than GDP asymmetry as
long as these factor income °ows from abroad are not perfectly correlated with domestic
GDP and therefore smooth GNP (and income). The empirical ¯nding that GNP asymmetry
is higher than GDP asymmetry implies that the volatility of net factor income °ows from
abroad is higher than the volatility of GDP in the countries of origin. We speculate that this
happens due to the high (some would say \excessive") volatility of ¯nancial returns and due
to these returns not providing a hedge against domestic GDP °uctuations (i.e., foreign asset
holdings are not acquired mainly for hedging domestic output risk and, thus, do not provide
returns that are negatively correlated with the output of the home economy). As long as a
substantial fraction of foreign asset holdings in EU countries takes the form of assets traded
on foreign stock and bond exchanges, rather than foreign direct investment, it may be the
case that the asset income from such international investments boosts the variance of GNP
in each country, rather than stabilizing it. As ¯nancial integration deepens, and more foreign
investments take the form of direct investment in productive assets, it is likely that the degree
of GNP asymmetry will decline and fall below that of GDP asymmetry, as is the case in the
20United States.
4 Implications for Europe
To start with one point that seems to have been somewhat ignored in the literature: Asym-
metry of output shocks is not likely to create strains in a currency union unless it creates high
asymmetry of income and consumption.37 Asymmetry of output is obviously a determinant
of income asymmetry, but this asymmetry is directly mitigated if inter-country risk sharing
in signi¯cant. Our measure of risk sharing has the simple interpretation of measuring the
percentage of country-speci¯c shocks to output (in percent growth terms) that is passed on
to income. In the United States, we ¯nd that less than 50 percent of output shocks are
re°ected in income shocks (which are further smoothed through federal taxes and transfers).
We expect countries in the EU to reach similar levels of risk sharing and our results indicate
that this process is currently gaining momentum.38 It is worth noticing that the degree of
risk sharing in the United States is still increasing in spite of having already reached a high
level.
The impact of trade on asymmetry, stressed by Krugman (1993), has received much at-
tention. Other things equal, lower trade barriers should lead to more inter-industry trade
and greater industrial specialization which, in turn, should result in greater GDP asym-
metry. Frankel and Rose (1998) argued that demand spillovers and (in particular) more
intra-industry trade might dominate this e®ect and could render GDP asymmetry smaller,
not larger. They show empirically that indeed, this e®ect dominates in the data. Their work
does not take into account the direct e®ect of risk sharing on specialization documented by
Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha (2003a) and the resulting e®ect on asymmetry docu-
mented by Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha (2001) and Imbs (2003).
The current paper does not update the analysis in these earlier papers but rather looks at
37Supra-national governments can smooth disposable income but, according to Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and
Yosha (1996), even in the United States where the federal government is quite big, this channel is less important
than income smoothing on capital markets. Asymmetry of consumption °uctuations is, in our view, generally
less reliable empirically because variation often seems to be caused by taste shocks making measures of
consumption asymmetry suspect for evaluating welfare gains from risk sharing.
38The U.S. results are not directly comparable since they also include within-state income smoothing through
earning retention (dividend payout) patterns.
21the time-series patterns. These seem highly consistent with these earlier results, risk sharing
in the EU has been increasing and so has industrial specialization. We speculate that risk
sharing plays an important causal role because trade barriers have been low within the EU
for a long period of time and the e®ect of lower trade barriers may, therefore, partly have
played itself out. More empirical work will be needed to test this conjecture.
Surprisingly, output asymmetry has declined steeply over the last two decades. We cannot
tell which of the channels we identify in Figure 4 is the cause of this result. It may be due
to more coordinated policy as countries were adjusting their ¯scal policy in order to meet
the Maastricht criteria, but a similar result was found for U.S. states so the ¯nding may be
simply due to a di®erent nature of the shocks to the world economy in the 1990s (in°ation
being conquered in the 1990s, the \new economy," ...).
We found higher asymmetry of GNP than of GDP among EU countries. As mentioned,
one component of net factor income °ows are returns from international equity investment.
An active literature has documented that developed country stock and bond market returns
have been highly correlated recently diminishing the stabilizing impact of diversi¯cation; see,
for example, Goetzman, Li, and Rouwenhorst (2002) and Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh (2002).
It may be that these ¯ndings from ¯nancial markets have the same roots as our ¯ndings of
declining GDP asymmetry although we leave empirical corroboration of this conjecture for
future research. This does not rule out GNP asymmetry being higher than GDP asymmetry
if international investments take place mainly through equity traded on stock markets be-
cause stock market volatility typically far exceeds the volatility of GDP. Our expectation is
that as ¯nancial integration further progresses and cross-border investments become further
diversi¯ed, the variance of factor income °ows will decline and GNP will become less asym-
metric than GDP. This conjecture is, of course, strongly in°uenced by the observation that
risk sharing among U.S. states has led to sharply lower asymmetry of income relative to the
asymmetry of state-level GDP.
All in all, we expect to see risk sharing between EU countries increasing further. This
should lead to more specialization, and we expect the resulting increase in the asymmetry of
GDP °uctuations to have small welfare costs as better risk sharing lowers the asymmetry of
income (and GNP) °uctuations.
EU governments can help promote inter-country risk sharing by removing barriers to
22international °ows of credit (for example, by being more supportive of cross-border mergers
of ¯nancial institutions). They can further provide risk sharing by strengthening funds that
provide insurance against economic calamities that may a®ect whole countries. However|in
light of the ¯ndings for the United States|the bulk of risk sharing within the EU can be
expected to come from further private capital market integration. EU governments can help
this process by removing any remaining barriers a®ecting the ability of mutual funds and, in
particular, pension funds to diversify internationally.
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28Appendix A: Relation between GDP and GNP of (say) the United States:
U.S. GDP (Gross value of production physically in the United States)
+ Income from U.S. owned direct investment in other countries
{ Income of foreign owned direct investment in the United States
+ Income from U.S. owned portfolio investment in other countries
{ Income of foreign owned portfolio investment in the United States
+ Income from U.S. government investment in other countries
{ Income of foreign investment in United States government assets
+ Wage and salary earned in other countries by residents of the United States
{ Wage and salary earned in the United States by residents of other countries
= U.S. GNP (Gross value of production owned by U.S. residents)
+ Subsidies - Indirect business taxes
{ Corporate saving
{ Net interest
+ Personal interest income
{ Contributions for social insurance
+ Government transfers to persons
= Personal Income
Notes: (i) Residents of the United States contribute to U.S. GNP whether they are citizens
of the Unites States or not and, while the number of foreign citizens in the United States is
large, the total wage and salary of foreign residents in the United States is fairly small (less
than 4% of total U.S. income payments to foreign countries in 2002).
(ii) Government investments abroad are mainly o±cial currency reserves, while government
liabilities are mainly treasury securities.
This Table is a simpli¯ed version, which leaves out some minor components. See, for exam-
ple, the National Income and Product Accounts published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis for further details. Numbers for international income receipts and payments can be
found at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/01statab/foreign.pdf, Table 1281.
29Appendix B: Data
Data for U.S. states are collected from various sources (state level GDP data are from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis) documented in Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996). Na-
tional Accounts data for the EU are from the OECD National Accounts Volume 1, Revision
2002. To calculate the specialization index, we use data from the OECD National Accounts
Volume 2, Revision 2002, in current prices. 10 1-digit ISIC sectors and 9 manufacturing GDP
2-digit ISIC sectors are shown below.
1-digit ISIC sectors
1. Agriculture, ¯shing, hunting and forestry
2. Mining and quarrying
3. Construction
4. Manufacturing
5. Electricity, gas and water supply
6. Transport, storage and communication
7. Wholesale and retail trade
8. Finance, insurance, and real estate
9. Services
10. Government
2-digit Manufacturing ISIC sectors
1. Food, beverages and tobacco
2. Textile, wearing apparel and leather industries
3. Wood and wood products, including furniture
4. Paper and paper products, printing and publishing
5. Chemicals and chemical petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic products
6. Non-metallic mineral products, except products of petroleum and coal
7. Basic metal industries
8. Fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment
9. Other manufactured products
30Table 1: Risk sharing through international factor income °ows: EU 1972{2000
Sample 1972{1982 1983{1992 1993{2000
EU8
Risk sharing (¯K) 4 2 11
(2) (1) (3)
EU14
Risk sharing (¯K) 0 {7 6
(0) (4) (2)
Euro area
Risk sharing (¯K) 2 {8 9
(2) (4) (4)
Notes: ¯K measures income insurance among the countries of the risk sharing group
and is obtained from the panel regression ¢log GNPit ¡ ¢log GNPt = constant +
¯K (¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it; where ¢log GDP and ¢log GNP are growth rates of per
capita GDP and GNP. t-statistics in parentheses. The entry for risk sharing (¯K) is the
percentage of a county-speci¯c shocks to output (GDP) that is not re°ected in GNP. EU8:
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United King-
dom. EU14: EU8 plus Austria, Finland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Euro area:
EU14 minus Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom .
31Table 2: Risk sharing through capital markets: U.S. states 1964{1998
1964{1970 1971{1980 1981{1990 1991{1998
Risk sharing (¯K) 29 42 48 55
(7) (8) (10) (14)
Notes: ¢logyit¡¢logyt = constant + ¯K (¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it; where ¢log GDP
and ¢logy are growth rates of per capita GDP and personal income. t-statistics in paren-
theses. The entry for risk sharing (¯K) is the percentage of a state-speci¯c shock to output
(to state-level GDP) that is not re°ected in state income (more precisely \state income"
constructed as in Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996)). The di®erence between GDP and
state income includes inter-state factor income °ows, depreciation, and corporate saving.
32Table 3: Asymmetry of GDP versus asymmetry of GNP and Income, U.S. and EU.
Sample 1983{1991 1991{1999
U.S.
Asymmetry (GDP) 2.99 0.89
Asymmetry (Income) 0.82 0.42
Sample 1983{1991 1991{2000
EU14
Asymmetry (GDP) 1.23 0.61
Asymmetry (GNP) 1.49 0.79
Notes: The asymmetry measure is calculated as 102 ¤ 1
± (1
2 ¾2 + 1
2¾2
i ¡ covi), where
¾2
i = var(¢log GDPi) [in other words, it is var(100 ¤ ¢log GDPi)], where covi =
cov(¢log GDPi;¢log GDP), and ± = 0:02 and ¾2 = 0:000839. The entry for asymmetry
is interpreted as the welfare gain that a state/country would obtain from fully diversifying
any state/country-speci¯c variance in output/GNP/Personal Income expressed in terms of
the percent permanent increase in GDP that would result in the same utility gain. EU14:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.Output
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Figure 1: The E®ects of Economic Integration on Fluctuations Asymmetry
(A stylized picture)
34Notes: The solid line represents the average level of risk sharing between Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. The dashed line represents the average risk sharing between countries in the same  
group without Finland and Sweden.
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Figure 3b: Average Specialization in the U.S.: 1-Digit ISIC Level
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Figure 4a: Average Specialization in the EU: 2-Digit ISIC Level
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